Forum Forum invoke, and who casts the seducer into hell at the end of the play. As I pointed out in my article, it is only in this context that the ending of the play is defensible. Otherwise, we must stand with Camus and Dom Juan himself. We must believe that Moliere has insulted his audience by granting a soulless lump of cold stone an arbitrary victory over his human hero. This supernatural ending to a drama of purely physical action would be a nasty, tawdry contradiction of the play's entire momentum. I will spare the reader a recapitulation of my entire argument in support of my interpretation of the conflict, but it seems to me evident that only by admitting God as Dom Juan's principal antagonist can one make tolerable sense of Moliere's play.
FRANCIS L. LAWRENCE Tulane University

Wordsworth's Later Style
To the Editor:
The three "close readings" described in the March 1978 Editor's Column were introduced with this line from Marianne Moore: "we do not admire what we cannot understand." The proposition is, of course, as patently false to experience as is Keats's at the end of the "Ode on a Grecian Urn." We often admire exceedingly what we do not understand, precisely because we do not understand it. This is as true of literary criticism as of religious revelation (the two activities having become strangely similar these days), and one of the three "close readings" referred to is a significant case in point. I admire Geoffrey Hartman's article "Blessing the Torrent: On Wordsworth's Later Style" (PMLA, 93 [1978] , 196-204) because, as one of the specialist readers noted, it seems to "open perspectives." I am haunted by the possibility, however, that my admiration is naive and that what I would believe is sublimity of thought may be, in part at least, ingenious confusion.
It would be unfair not to place the Wordsworth article in context. Hartman is quite consciously voyaging on strange seas of hermeneutic thought. His professed aim is to "de-normalize" what appears to be a reasonably "normal" sonnet by revealing "an unapparent meaning"; or, as he puts it in the Preface to Beyond Formalism, "to release a hidden or repressed content." Now a certain latitude must be allowed to an enterprise that takes literary criticism into the realm not only of philosophy but of psychoanalysis as well. We suffer, therefore, the obstructive, opaque, and esoteric jargon-"infinitizing," invoke, and who casts the seducer into hell at the end of the play. As I pointed out in my article, it is only in this context that the ending of the play is defensible. Otherwise, we must stand with Camus and Dom Juan himself. We must believe that Moliere has insulted his audience by granting a soulless lump of cold stone an arbitrary victory over his human hero. This supernatural ending to a drama of purely physical action would be a nasty, tawdry contradiction of the play's entire momentum. I will spare the reader a recapitulation of my entire argu It would be unfair not to place the Wordsworth article in context. Hartman is quite consciously voyaging on strange seas of hermeneutic thought. His professed aim is to "de-normalize" what appears to be a reasonably "normal" sonnet by revealing "an unapparent meaning"; or, as he puts it in the Preface to Beyond Formalism, "to release a hidden or repressed content." Now a certain latitude must be allowed to an enterprise that takes literary criticism into the realm not only of philosophy but of psychoanalysis as well. We suffer, therefore, the obstructive, opaque, and esoteric jargon-"infinitizing," 139 139 "phantomized," "the topos of the sublime as such, of the atopic," "uncovers a traumatological structure," "Wordsworth's lucy-feric style . . . appears to be the opposite of luciferic." But our hopes of liberating Hartman's own "hidden" meanings from all this are not always fulfilled. Sometimes it takes an act of blind faith to believe that such verbal pyrotechnics signify something more than sound and fury.
And if we do possess that requisite faith (or credulity), there are both theoretical and practical difficulties to be faced. Whatever else it may involve, interpretation cannot escape the fact that it is also an act of persuasion that necessarily has to do with rules of evidence and argumentation. His discussion of the verb "possess" in Section vi of the article is, I think, a fair and typical example. Although both English usage and poetic context suggest the contrary, Hartman decides that "we cannot be sure that 'possess' is in the indicative." He then piles hypothetical assumptions one upon the other-"It might be read," "if we understand," "may involve"-to arrive at the reading he desires: Wordsworth blesses the torrent. Certainly the rules of English grammar do not stand in his way: "Though this further reading does not harmonize grammatically with the line that follows, it may hover over it as an inward possibility." There may be enlightened readers of Kenneth Burke to whom such a statement is meaningful. Not being among them, I can only conclude that Hartman is simply trying to have his cake and eat it too. Anything, it seems, can mean or echo anything (see the discussion of supposed Miltonic echoes in Section VII), as long as we attach enough "may's," "might's," and "if's."
It is not easy to decide whether these extravagances are personal or methodological. Have Hartman's productive insights into Romantic placenames become a compulsive hobbyhorse? Or does the article suggest the inherent danger of "Continental" modes of criticism? If the critic proposes a journey beyond formalism in order to liberate the repressed content of a poem, he must somehow persuade us that the subjectivity so liberated transcends his own. I doubt that Hartman always succeeds in doing this. His entry into the sonnet is by way of his "phantomized," "the topos of the sublime as such, of the atopic," "uncovers a traumatological structure," "Wordsworth's lucy-feric style . . . appears to be the opposite of luciferic." But our hopes of liberating Hartman's own "hidden" meanings from all this are not always fulfilled. Sometimes it takes an act of blind faith to believe that such verbal pyrotechnics signify something more than sound and fury.
It is not easy to decide whether these extravagances are personal or methodological. Have Hartman's productive insights into Romantic placenames become a compulsive hobbyhorse? Or does the article suggest the inherent danger of "Continental" modes of criticism? If the critic proposes a journey beyond formalism in order to liberate the repressed content of a poem, he must somehow persuade us that the subjectivity so liberated transcends his own. I doubt that Hartman always succeeds in doing this. His entry into the sonnet is by way of his One can reply to a polemical piece; it is harder to engage something that despite its faint opening praise does not really try to understand the perspective and critical style it attacks. I won't defend that style here; but I can suggest that Hall's call for law, order, and proper argument has its own questionable assumptions that, to my mind, depress literary studies today.
I note first that no counterinterpretation is offered. A normal interpretation is assumed-perhaps the one I start from in my essay-but that has never been articulated. Even a "normal" interpretation has to be made; it is not a given until it is made. How easy and fruitless it is to insist that poets have their commonsensical, normal meaning, without articulating it! Anyone who does try to express that meaning would learn, however, that poems of stature achieve their so-called normalcy against odds, which remain part of the meaning. Interpretation, I. A. Richards once said, is always a victory against odds.
There may not even be a single location of meaning. The interpreter is bound to enter the scene of interpretation, either in his own person or in a representative capacity. All meaning is received meaning. Moreover, the retroactive force of literature on literature-and literature for me includes the literature of criticism and scholarship-is by now too well substantiated to be reduced to subjectivity and personalism.
Hall thinks I am interested in what is "unapparent" for egotistical reasons. By constructing an unapparent meaning I try to become apparent as interpreter. Yet he does not refute the interpretation put forward; instead, by his own appeal to the reader he claims (1) that I have not followed certain rules of the game, so my findings cannot be admitted, and (2) that some of my findings (not clearly specified) might be worthwhile but that others (specified) are "shallow bits of ingenuity." Granted that he did not have the space to back his arguments fully, he still should have said something about the rules, and should not have assumed so magisterially that every sane reader shares his understanding of them. Concerning the "unapparent" level of meaning, I go as carefully as possible from more apparent to less apparent, although these distinctions are relative. What is less apparent today may be apparent enough tomorrow; the obverse movement, from apparent to unapparent, is also familiar to those who appreciate the mutability of language and of meaning. Has Hall never questioned the appearances? "The unsaid part is the best of every discourse" (Emerson).
I return to the issue of rules. What constitutes evidence, or the relation of hypothesis to proof, is, as everyone knows, much disputed. If, for instance, one does not accept any meaning that is not straightforwardly grammatical, then indeed one must reject my interpretation of "possess" in line 13 of Wordsworth's "To the Torrent at Devil's Bridge." But if grammatical expression is considered as only one rule by which to determine meaning in poetry, then the situation changes. My subject was not Wordsworth's grammar or his poetic ingenuity in that area but his remarkable attitude toward the "force" of language. The grammatical point about "possess" is subordinated in my essay to Wordsworth's concern with naming, cursing, and blessing, whose locutionary force may extend (that was my suggestion) to such grammatical particulars.
Hall, I suspect, has a more prudential (he calls it "plain speech") understanding of language than I have. He combs my essay to show that it is iffy in a way that hides assertiveness, that it plays with terms, and that it is unquantitative. Though he considers these as flaws of argumentation, they seem to me presumptive matters of style. He is less of a logician than an arbiter elegantiarum. But I don't want to dispute a particular point: it is the entire attitude of the man that is perplexing. What if the game of criticism has changed, or the rules of the game are being questioned? Even if that were not so, do we want critics to be certified by a Normal School?
As to style, it is conceivable that a flexible or playful mode of writing-apparently admitted only outside of criticism-comes closer to the rules of the language game than Hall's sober, scientific, and uppity standards. Besides, he knows he is not all that objective. " He himself violates a rule of the game, as I understand it, by an imperfect quotation from Beyond Formalism that makes it appear as if I were a vulgar demystifier or depth analyst. The preface to my book discusses a difference in the concept of literary form. I do not simply justify the Continental style of criticism but point out, rather, that "it often neglects literary form and dissolves art into a reflex of consciousness, technology, or social process." I go on to suggest, however, that "In Anglo-America, respect for literary form is a priori, but not necessarily deeper. A more radical difference between the two approaches [Continental and Anglo-American] centers on the presumed objectivity of the work of art: for us the reader in his selfhood is the problem, and one does not accept any meaning that is not straightforwardly grammatical, then indeed one must reject my interpretation of "possess" in line 13 of Wordsworth's "To the Torrent at Devil's Bridge." But if grammatical expression is considered as only one rule by which to determine meaning in poetry, then the situation changes. My subject was not Wordsworth's grammar or his poetic ingenuity in that area but his remarkable attitude toward the "force" of language. The grammatical point about "possess" is subordinated in my essay to Wordsworth's concern with naming, cursing, and blessing, whose locutionary force may extend (that was my suggestion) to such grammatical particulars.
As to style, it is conceivable that a flexible or playful mode of writing-apparently admitted only outside of criticism-comes closer to the rules of the language game than Hall's sober, scientific, and uppity standards. Besides, he knows he is not all that objective. " Like many other types of linguistic, stylistic, and philosophical theory, Greimas' concepts of Subject, Object, Beneficiary, and the rest are too narrowly based on Indo-European grammatical structure. The major clause or "sentence" in modern French, English, and other Indo-European languages has one element traditionally termed the "subject," one the "direct object," and one the "indirect object" (all three of them either simple or compound), and various complements indicating helpers, obstacles, and the like. This type of linguistic structure is the obvious source not only of Greimas' analysis but also of medieval philosophers' distinctions between the signans (nominative, hence "actor" or subject, "that which signifies") and the signatum (accusative, hence "goal" or direct object, "that which is signified") and of Ferdinand de Saussure's corresponding formulation of the linguistic sign as involving a signifiant and a signifie.
These structural features are far from universal. Even Latin sentence structure did not involve the obligatory presence of a subject (cf. such impersonal verbs as pluit 'it rains,' which, in their literal meaning, cannot have a subject). Greimasian analysis in terms of a single Subject and Object is applicable only to tightly knit works such as Racinian tragedies (cf. the old parallel between the five acts of Berenice and the five-word Tacitean sentence Titus Berenicen invitus invitam dimisit). he needs historical, philological, or similar correctives . . . but for the Continental critic it is the objective form of art that seems problematic, and he seeks to liberate it, to release a hidden or repressed content." Hall leaves out the concluding sentence, with which I will conclude again, in the hope, now as then, of finding a better understanding in this country for an alternative, though by no means alien, mode of thinking about art. "Not our subjectivity is to be feared but our overreaction to it, those pseudo-objective criteria which imprison both the work and ourselves." Like many other types of linguistic, stylistic, and philosophical theory, Greimas' concepts of Subject, Object, Beneficiary, and the rest are too narrowly based on Indo-European grammatical structure. The major clause or "sentence" in modern French, English, and other Indo-European languages has one element traditionally termed the "subject," one the "direct object," and one the "indirect object" (all three of them either simple or compound), and various complements indicating helpers, obstacles, and the like. This type of linguistic structure is the obvious source not only of Greimas' analysis but also of medieval philosophers' distinctions between the signans (nominative, hence "actor" or subject, "that which signifies") and the signatum (accusative, hence "goal" or direct object, "that which is signified") and of Ferdinand de Saussure's corresponding formulation of the linguistic sign as involving a signifiant and a signifie.
These structural features are far from universal. Even Latin sentence structure did not involve the obligatory presence of a subject (cf. such impersonal verbs as pluit 'it rains,' which, in their literal meaning, cannot have a subject). Greimasian analysis in terms of a single Subject and Object is applicable only to tightly knit works such as Racinian tragedies (cf. the old parallel between the five acts of Berenice and the five-word Tacitean sentence Titus Berenicen invitus invitam dimisit).
